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INTRODUCTION
The expectation that social assistance would 
become unnecessary has not been fufi lled in 
most European countries. Instead, the extent 
of means-tested social assistance benefi ts 
has increased (Nelson, 2008). This has been 
due to the relatively high level of unemploy-
ment and the continuous transformation of 
family structures, which have reduced the ca-
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Abstract
This article discusses whether activation policies have had a positi-
ve effect on benefi ciaries of minimum income protection in Catalonia 
(Spain). The article fi rst confi rms that social assistance benefi ciaries 
with higher employability levels have greater chances of fi nding a job. 
Second, the article identifi es different profi les of benefi ciaries and exa-
mines the characteristics of those who did not fi nd jobs in a favourable 
economic context. The results suggest that it is personal problems 
that act as barriers. Third, the article also examines to what extent 
public management is responsible for the results. For this purpose, it 
compares the performance of administrative units, controlling for the 
characteristics of their clients. Finally, the article discusses whether 
making social assistance dependent on activation is a good strategy for 
the majority of benefi ciaries with particularly diffi cult profi les, and what 
administrations can do.
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Resumen
En este artículo se discute si las políticas de activación tienen un efecto 
positivo en los benefi ciarios del programa de renta mínima de inserción 
en Cataluña. En primer lugar, se confi rma que los benefi ciarios de la 
asistencia social con un elevado grado de empleabilidad tienen ma-
yores posibilidades de encontrar trabajo. En segundo lugar, el artículo 
identifi ca distintos perfi les de benefi ciarios y examina las características 
de los que no encuentran trabajo en un contexto económico favorable. 
Los resultados sugieren que los problemas personales actúan como 
barreras al empleo. En tercer lugar, el artículo también examina hasta 
qué punto los resultados obtenidos son atribuibles a la gestión pública 
del programa. A tal fi n, se comparan los resultados de las unidades 
de gestión, controlando por las características de sus clientes. Final-
mente, el artículo discute si la vinculación de la asistencia social con 
las políticas de activación es una buena estrategia para la mayoría de 
los benefi ciarios con perfi les especialmente difíciles y qué es lo que las 
administraciones pueden hacer al respecto.
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pacity of families to provide welfare to their 
members in diffi culty. European social policy 
can be seen as the outcome of a conver-
gence process, since there is a high degree 
of emulation and «soft» policy coordination 
(Ferrera et al., 2002). In this process, two 
terms are at the root of what is a common 
normative framework: «social inclusion» and 
«activation». At the same time, however, there 
are signifi cant differences in public efforts to 
fi nance social policies and in benefi t levels 
across European countries. This article is 
based on the analysis of a minimum income 
protection program in Catalonia (Spain), but 
it aims to produce evidence in relation to re-
search questions that are of general interest. 
The fi rst research question is whether the ex-
tension of activation policies has been posi-
tive for benefi ciaries of minimum income pro-
tection in terms of labour market integration. 
Analysis of similar policies in other countries 
(Lødemel and Trickey, 2001; Torfi ng, 1999; 
Barbier, 2001; Gilbert and Van Voorhis, 2001) 
has found that social assistance benefi cia-
ries with higher levels of employability had 
more chances of fi nding jobs and making the 
transition to formal employment. In the case 
of Spain, the job market for people with a 
low level of studies grew steadily for fourteen 
years, from 1993 to 2007. Jobs were created 
in construction, tourism, agriculture and do-
mestic services. Therefore, it was relatively 
easy to make the transition to employment 
for people who could actually work. In this 
economic context, people in minimum in-
come programs with high levels of employ-
ability should also have reduced their level 
of dependency on social assistance and in-
creased their capacity to be self-suffi cient. 
The second research question is related 
to the groups of benefi ciaries that did not 
fi nd jobs in a favourable economic context 
and continued to depend on social assis-
tance. The results show that this can be ex-
plained by personal and social conditions 
acting as barriers to labour market integration 
(Dan zinger et al., 2000; Ayala and Rodriguez, 
2006 and 2007). The mediating role played 
by individual factors in the effectiveness of 
public intervention is an interesting issue that 
can be analysed by looking at the links bet-
ween the socio-demographic and personal 
problems of social assistance recipients and 
their chances of fi nding employment.  
The lack of change in their personal situa-
tion could also be explained by group and 
community factors, but this research will 
focus on the potential negligence or ineffi -
ciency of the administration dealing with their 
particular cases. A third question is there-
fore whether institutional factors could also 
have a mediating effect. Many factors could 
be taken into consideration, such as the kind 
of program, its comprehensive structure, the 
resources available or the use of partnership 
networks. In the case of the Catalan pro-
gram, although the administrative offi ces in 
the region have similar resources and apply 
similar bureaucratic protocols, they differ in 
size, and a few of them are not public. Given 
the data available, one way to control the 
effect of the institutional factor is to control 
for whether administrative units with similar 
clients, in terms of their employability, obtain 
similar levels of labour market integration 
when the economic context for the whole 
region is favourable for fi nding low quality 
jobs. Moreover, it is also possible to see to 
what extent the size and the nature of the 
administrative unit (whether public or private) 
play a role. 
The fi nal question points to policy. The 
persistence of a signifi cant number of bene-
fi ciaries in a context of economic expansion 
should be interpreted as an indication that, at 
least in the case of the Catalan program, the 
implementation of activation policies has not 
been effective, particularly for people with 
weak links to the labour market. The question 
is whether public administrations, and in par-
ticular the Catalan one, can help households 
overcome the barriers they are experiencing 
with current programs. In a context of eco-
nomic expansion, administrative units can re-
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duce their caseloads and hence devote more 
time and effort to each remaining individual; 
however, it is not clear that this is suffi cient 
given the complexity of problems in some of 
the cases. 
The article is divided into four main sec-
tions. The fi rst section is used to present the 
theoretical framework and contextualise the 
paper within contemporary social and eco-
nomic research on minimum income protec-
tion. The second section describes the par-
ticularities of Spanish policies as an example 
of European and Southern European mini-
mum income policy. Having presented the 
policy framework, the third section justifi es 
the value of studying the Catalan program 
and presents the data used. The fourth sec-
tion analyses the data and presents the main
fi ndings. A fi nal section summarizes the con-
clusions and policy insights. 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
In the background of this research are the 
theories on social exclusion —and its mirror 
concept of social inclusion—. However, this 
research aims to contribute to the literature 
on the relation between social policy —and, 
more specifi cally, minimum income— and em-
ployment. 
Benefi ciaries of minimum income pro-
grams are diverse and present different lev-
els of social exclusion. The problems experi-
enced by benefi ciaries are often complex and 
are the consequence of the non-realization 
of social rights such as the right to a cer-
tain standard of living, the right to educa-
tion, to employment or to housing (Room, 
1991). Compared to poverty, which is usually 
defi ned in terms of income, the concept of 
social exclusion has a multifaceted and dy-
namic nature that captures the complexity of 
the processes affecting people who not only 
live in harsh conditions but also may suffer 
isolation from other members of society in 
terms of both social networks and general 
norms of behaviour (Vranken, 2001). Public 
policies are supposed to accompany those 
suffering marginalization on their «road back 
into society», but the journey leading to inclu-
sion implies value changes and behavioural 
adaptations that make it more diffi cult than 
the opposite journey leading to exclusion. 
The central question for public policy and 
public administrations concerns combating 
social exclusion and reintegrating individuals 
and groups. But this is a vast undertaking if 
it is understood in all its dimensions —em-
ployment, social networks, political partici-
pation and cultural integration— and levels 
—individual, group or society— (Silver, 1995). 
Appropriate public policies to deal with the 
interconnected dimension of social exclu-
sion are very expensive and require fl exible 
administrations. More often, public adminis-
trations work with the hypothesis that inclu-
sion in one domain —employment— will also 
imply inclusion in other domains. From this 
perspective, social policy tends to be reduc-
tionist. Apparently, public policy is supposed 
to pursue very broad goals, but in practice it 
focuses on the redistribution of few resourc-
es with limited effects on benefi ciaries (Adel-
antado, Noguera and Rambla, 2000), particu-
larly with regard to access to employment. 
The relation between social assistance 
and employment has been the object of the 
literature for a long time now. The concern 
that social assistance could favour behaviour 
leading to public dependency and a reduc-
tion in the intensity of the search for jobs was 
the justifi cation for the turn towards «active» 
employment policies. Part of the literature 
on «active» employment policies provides 
evidence on the effects of the market on de-
pendency duration. Findings suggest that the 
impact of the market is less decisive than it 
was thought to be. Some studies in the nine-
ties (Hoynes and MacCurdy, 1994; Sandefur 
and Cook, 1997) observed how variations in 
market conditions had an impact on welfare 
dependency but concluded that they were 
less important than demographic variables 
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or duration in programs. However, other 
studies found evidence of a link between a 
strong economy and exit from welfare (Grog-
ger, 2004). 
Most of the studies provide evidence on 
the effects of socio-demographic characte-
ristics of households, but it is less common to 
provide information on the personal and so-
cial problems of welfare benefi ciaries (Ayala 
and Rodriguez, 2006, 2007). It is generally 
agreed that the chances of entering the la-
bour market increase with education levels or 
work experience, and that certain characte-
ristics of households, such as being a single 
parent with dependent children, tend to make 
the transition to employment more diffi cult. 
However, only some studies have looked 
into personal problems acting as «barriers» 
to employment. This kind of problem can be 
related to a criminal background, drug or al-
cohol abuse, health or mental health weak-
nesses. According to Danzinger et al. (2000) 
and Ayala and Rodriguez (2006, 2007), the 
presence of such problems explains longer 
periods of time spent on welfare programs 
and the failure to fi nd employment.
FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE: 
EUROPEAN AND SPANISH POLICY 
During the nineties, European countries fol-
lowed different paths in social assistance 
provision. Some northern countries like Swe-
den eliminated the idea of social assistance 
and use the term «unemployment benefi ts» 
for any person with no previous work record 
(Nelson, 2008). Others, mainly southern 
countries like Spain, complemented their 
 social protection nets with means-tested pro-
grams in the nineties and continued to offer 
minimum income protection as a last resort 
to prevent social exclusion. 
Comparative analysis of social policy in 
Europe tends to classify countries into diffe-
rent groups (Eardley, Bradshaw et al., 1996; 
Ferrera and Rhodes, 2000; Ferrera, 2005). 
Southern European countries have similar 
institutional and administrative structures 
and they have developed similar policies to 
complement social protection with programs 
that are based on targeting certain groups. 
From this perspective, according to various 
authors (Ferrera, 2005; Arriba and Pérez, 
2007), minimum income programs perform a 
similar function within welfare provision. They 
were introduced to widen the system and of-
fer protection to the unemployed of working 
age without unemployment protection. 
The relation between work and social as-
sistance became one of the central issues in 
government agendas during the nineties. The 
immediate effect was a tendency to make as-
sistance conditional on participation in activi-
ties that theoretically lead to employment. The 
substitution of direct cash handout measures 
for measures designed to stimulate the return 
to work had been proposed by the OECD 
(OECD, 2004). A second defi ning element of 
social policy in the nineties was the emphasis 
on «social inclusion», which was expected to 
come about through employment. Following 
the European Council of Lisbon (2000), EU 
national governments committed themselves 
to developing National Plans for Social Inclu-
sion (Ferrera et al., 2002). This clearly shows 
that EU national governments had assumed 
the activation discourse and the need to ad-
dress individual skills and capacities to over-
come unemployment and social exclusion. 
However, while there is convergence in 
various aspects of social policy and «Euro-
peanization» without formal regulations (Ra-
daelli, 2000), there are also signifi cant dif-
ferences in the fi nancial investment and the 
practical arrangements made to provide poor 
and needy citizens with minimum income 
protection across countries. The level of pu-
blic spending on activation policies varies 
substantially (OECD, 2005): countries with a 
universal system of unemployment protection 
spend more public resources on activation 
strategies, continental countries with a con-
tribution system have an intermediate level 
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of public investment, and southern European 
and Anglo-Saxon countries have lower levels 
of spending. As a consequence, there is also 
substantial cross-national variation in benefi t 
levels (Nelson, 2008). Income protection in 
the country with the highest level of invest-
ment is about twice that of the least gener-
ous country. In addition, in most countries, 
the rates of social assistance vary according 
to family type as well as number and ages of 
children. There is no uniform treatment given 
to one particular family type across countries. 
Another source of variation is the in-
tensity of the efforts made by public ad-
ministrations in looking for jobs, working 
with local associations and employers or, 
alternatively, helping benefi ciaries address 
personal problems, train and adapt to the 
changing market conditions (Hvinden, 1999; 
Geldof, 1999; Moreira, 2008). From this last 
perspective, one of the key issues is to per-
sonalize the treatment given to each indi-
vidual in order to improve their chances of 
long-term success. As opposed to a more 
direct «workfare» approach, some benefi -
ciaries need to climb the «ladder» towards 
self-suffi ciency. This involves solving basic 
problems fi rst, before developing new skills 
and competencies, and preparing to move 
into the job market. This long-term strategy 
requires time and intensive tutoring on the 
part of social services. 
That is why, in practice, not all adminis-
trations implement the general ideas behind 
activation in the same way (Barbier, 2001). It 
is quite reasonable to assume that strategies 
requiring intensive individual attention are not 
realistic with high benefi ciaries-to-supervisor 
ratios or when the public administration has 
not developed suffi cient contacts at local lev-
el. The result in such cases is likely to be that 
benefi ciaries remain in the minimum income 
programs and develop a «chronic» condi-
tion. At the same time, as indicated by Arriba 
and Pérez (2007), if the policy changes and 
«chronic» benefi ciaries are penalized for not 
entering the job market, the immediate result 
is to increase the vulnerability of a signifi cant 
portion of the population in need of economic 
protection.  
In the Spanish case, the central govern-
ment manages pensions and non-contribution 
pensions while regional governments manage 
minimum income protection. Both programs 
are designed to guarantee minimum assis-
tance and they are central elements in the 
fi ght against social exclusion. The two pro-
grams can be considered as the last resort 
of a network of social protection (Arriba and 
Moreno, 2005). They guarantee a similar level 
of income depending on family size. 
Following the French Revenu Minimum 
d’Insertion (RMI) model, the general objective 
of the regional programs is the social integra-
tion of families with very low or no income. 
Like the French RMI, Spanish programs com-
bine subsidies with social integration actions 
based on the signing of an integration con-
tract between the social worker and the re-
cipient. 
The fi rst region to start such a program 
was the Basque Country in 1988. More than 
twenty years later, there are signifi cant re-
gional differences in benefi t levels, in the 
scope of the programs and in the treatment 
of benefi ciaries. The Basque Country and 
Navarre offer higher benefi ts. In Catalonia, 
the object of analysis, an effort is made to 
adjust the measures provided to the perso-
nal situation and employability of the benefi -
ciary. 
In the case of Spain, the resources aimed 
at minimum income benefi ciaries are much 
lower than in Nordic or Continental Euro-
pean countries. Following the French exam-
ple, however, some local governments and 
economic and social agents have developed 
projects with the aim of creating employment 
for the benefi ciaries of minimum income, at 
local level. Some of the benefi ciaries, for 
 example, are trained and employed in local 
social services for the elderly and families 
with dependency problems.
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THE CATALAN MINIMUM INCOME 
PROGRAM 
The analysis uses data from a program that 
is now twenty years old, having been created 
in 1990. It has undergone few reforms and 
can be seen as representative of the South-
ern European version of minimum income 
protection. It is an interesting case to study 
the consequences of activation policies on 
those at risk of social exclusion, for various 
reasons: 
First, like other similar programs in France 
and Spain, it provides universal coverage, 
differentiated benefi t amounts and formal 
activation procedures. However, the program 
classifi es minimum income recipients into 
two groups: those who are prepared to work 
and those who need to overcome personal 
problems before the administration consi-
ders them to be ready to enter the job mar-
ket. This double itinerary is interesting, since 
it is the expression of a more direct «work-
fare» approach and a more indirect «personal 
development» approach to activation.
Second, the researchers had access to 
the administrative records of the whole popu-
lation receiving minimum income protection 
in the region for three years, from 2003 to 
2005 (more than 18,000 administrative re-
cords). Such a large number of observations 
makes it possible to observe distributions 
across associations and to consider gener-
alising the fi ndings to other regions in Spain, 
as well as to other countries in Southern 
Europe with similar institutional and admin-
istrative structures. 
Third, the program is managed by the 
Catalan government through a network of 
456 local offi ces. The distribution of the pro-
gram throughout the region provides an op-
portunity to examine whether administrative 
effectiveness plays a role in the success of 
benefi ciaries. Unexpectedly good results in 
offi ces covering «diffi cult» cases can be in-
terpreted as a sign of better implementation. 
Differences in caseload size also offer an op-
portunity to check the effect of this variable 
on the results. 
Minimum income protection in the re-
gion of Catalonia is reserved for those who 
are poor and have never been entitled to 
unemployment benefi ts, or have used up 
entitlements and are no longer eligible for 
other forms of income protection. Eligibility 
is limited by age, with an upper limit of 65 
and a lower limit of 25. It applies to house-
holds that have been offi cially registered in 
the region for some time before applying to 
the program. Because of similar regulations, 
strict residence requirements and low 
benefi ts across Spain, there are no welfare 
migration problems. 
Individual benefi ciaries receive an amount 
of less than €400 which is supplemented with 
a fl at amount per child and if certain obliga-
tions are complied with. Average benefi ts 
are below the offi cial administrative poverty 
line, but large families can receive amounts 
that are close to the lower working salaries. 
Benefi ts are compatible with earnings for a 
certain number of months and are automati-
cally renewed on a yearly basis with no time 
limit for households that continue to earn in-
suffi cient resources and comply with the ob-
ligations set. Recipients who fail to comply 
with the integration contract or fail to attend 
interviews may have their benefi ts suspend-
ed or cancelled. However, benefi ciaries may 
have informal earnings or work temporarily. 
Administrative records include information 
on socio-demographic characteristics of 
households (age, sex, family size, education 
level, nationality, mobility). They also include 
information on the various kinds of problems 
recipients may have, some health-related 
(physical, mental, drug or alcohol abuse), 
others with an economic or social dimension 
(debt, prostitution, begging, homelessness). 
The database also provides information 
on the measures taken by the administration. 
Case workers have the discretionary power to 
decide whether benefi ciaries follow a short-
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term working strategy or a longer-term treat-
ment including social, health or educational 
measures. Benefi ciaries who are ready to 
work take training courses and are supervised 
in their job search. Some have the opportu-
nity to gain real work experience through an 
internship. 
In this study cases are classifi ed as a «suc-
cess» if the recipient ceased to receive public 
aid due to earnings through work. They are 
considered a «failure» if the household con-
tinued in the program because the benefi cia-
ries did not manage to fi nd a job. Cases are 
considered «neutral» when they were closed 
for reasons other than work, such as reaching 
the age of 65, moving outside the region or 
having access to some other income.  
ANALYSIS
Since the analysis was limited to a single re-
gion and macroeconomic conditions did not 
vary across individuals, it does not include 
measures of the economic environment. Ins-
tead, the analysis concentrates on the ef-
fects of individual and institutional factors. 
Thus, it fi rst looks at whether minimum in-
come benefi ciaries, who were considered 
ready to work by social workers and placed 
on a «labour market integration itinerary», 
actually succeeded and left dependency be-
hind. Second, it analyses the characteristics 
and personal problems that acted as barri-
ers to employment for the benefi ciaries who 
continued to depend on social assistance. 
Third, the hypothesis that administrative ef-
fi ciency could be a factor is considered by 
ascertaining whether administrative units 
have a rate of success that is explained by 
the complexity or the number of cases they 
manage. The last part of the analysis cen-
tres on benefi ciary profi les and on those that 
tend to become chronic. The point is that, for 
some group profi les, conditions and obliga-
tions included in individual contracts can be 
oriented towards personal development. In 
the same way, administrative units should be
judged on the personal development pro-
gress of benefi ciaries rather than on job 
placements when beneficiaries are not 
classed as ready to work.  
Brief descriptive analysis
A descriptive analysis of the cases gives a 
brief overview of the benefi ciaries of the Ca-
talan minimum income program. In terms of 
gender, women account for a large majority 
(around 66.7%). The data on age shows a 
greater presence of middle-aged individuals. 
Regarding family structure, a huge number 
(77.6%) corresponds to people living alone 
(43.5% without dependent children, and 
34.1% with dependent children). They are 
mostly Spanish nationals and have low levels 
of formal education (only 17% reached se-
condary education or higher). The percent-
age of households of other nationalities is 
small except for recipients born in Northern 
Africa (Maghreb countries, 11.2%).
The reason for their precarious situ-
ation is often related to a labour, health or 
drug consumption problem. Mental health 
accounts for 10% of all cases. The admi-
nistration applied supervision procedures to 
almost all cases. A large majority (71%) was 
subject to labour activation measures, more 
than half were subject to health-related mea-
sures and around 40% to social and educa-
tion measures. The duration in the program 
is quite signifi cant (54.4% of the active cases 
in 2003-2005 had been so for one to three 
years previously, and 43.1% for longer). Two 
thirds of the benefi ciaries had not worked a 
single day during the entire period in which 
they received assistance.
The determinants of success
In order to explain the «successful» cases 
and quantify the factors which determine 
success in probability terms, a model of 
logistic regression was used. Success was 
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defi ned —rather narrowly— as labour mar-
ket integration without considering any other 
relevant outcome for social integration. The 
analysis was carried out in two steps. Firstly, 
it looked at the characteristics of households 
and individual benefi ciaries (model 1). Se-
condly, it looked into the effects of the pro-
gram (model 2). The analysis focuses on the 
measures taken by the administration, the time 
spent in the program and whether the ben-
efi ciary worked at least one day while on the 
program. The results of the analysis are pre-
sented in table 11. 
Preliminary exploratory analysis showed 
that the relation between the time spent in 
the program and the probability of success 
is not straightforward. In fact, while staying 
in the program a small number of years is 
associated with labour market integration, a 
long period appears as a negative factor. This 
does not mean it is the cause of not leaving 
dependency behind, but it could be used as 
an «alarm» signal by public administrations. 
The time spent in the program was broken 
down into three variables in order to estimate 
the effects of being a recipient for less than 
one year, between one and three years and 
for more than three years2.
A similar strategy was also applied to es-
timate the effect of the starting age. Since it 
was likely that the chances of labour market 
integration for people aged 50 or over were 
lower than those of younger people, the start-
ing age was broken down into two variables 
to test the effect of one additional year for 
each one of the two groups of benefi ciaries: 
1 Although the database contains all the active benefi cia-
ries between 2003 and 2005, we interpret the models 
by using signifi cance tests because we are interested in 
the possibility of inferring the results to the population of 
benefi ciaries in other time periods or similar programs.
2 The fi rst one is a dummy variable (less than 1 year = 1); 
the second is the interaction of the time spent in the 
program with a second dummy variable (between 1 and 
3 years = 1); and the third is the interaction of the time 
spent in the program with a third dummy variable (more 
than 3 years = 1).
those aged 49 or under and those aged 50 
or over3.
According to model 2 in table 1, sev-
eral factors are associated with the desired 
outcomes of minimum income recipients 
passing from receiving public aid to self-
dependency through work. Three of the main 
positive factors found are related to the basic 
hypothesis on dependency and employment: 
having spent less than a year in the program 
—or between one and three years—, ha ving 
gained some work experience during the 
program, and having entered the program 
because of unemployment. Regarding the 
duration, once recipients spent more than 
three years, each year in minimum income 
is associated with lower chances of exiting 
with labour market integration. To interpret 
this result correctly, it must be taken into ac-
count that the economic environment was 
particularly favourable at the time and that 
many low-paid jobs were available to people 
who had previous work experience.
Other relevant factors are related to the 
various socio-demographic variables and the 
measures taken by the administration. Men 
have a higher probability of fi nding a job than 
women, age becomes a barrier to employ-
ment from 50 onwards and those with a high-
er level of education have a better chance 
of exiting the program. At this level, it is in-
teresting to observe how immigrants were 
more associated with success than nation-
als. Among nationals, results were better for 
people who were actually claiming minimum 
income in a different place from where they 
were born. Regarding household size and 
location, having a family —that is, a partner 
and dependent children— is associated with 
success, whereas living in an urban popu-
lated area is not.
3 The fi rst one is the interaction between the age when 
entering the program and a fi rst dummy variable (age less 
than 50 = 1). The second one is the interaction between 
the age when entering the program and a second dummy 
variable (age equal to 50 or over = 1).
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TABLE 1.  Probability of labour market integration. Logistic regression coeffi cients (active benefi ciaries between 
2003 and 2005)
 Models
Characteristics of benefi ciaries 1 2
Sex    
  Male 0.23 *** 0.14 ***
Starting age
  Per additional year of age from 16 to 49  —  –0.01 ***
  Per additional year of age older than 49  –0.01 *** –0.02 ***
Education level (reference category: primary)    
  Incomplete primary or less –0.52 *** –0.33 ***
  Secondary  0.45 *** 0.41 ***
  University  0.29 *** 0.27 **
Nationality (reference category: Spanish)    
  Maghreb 0.45 *** 0.22 ***
  Sub-Saharan 1.00 *** 0.73 ***
  Latin American and Caribbean  0.40 *** 0.21 *
  Asian 1.16 *** 0.81 ***
  Eastern-Central European 0.50 * —
Household characteristics    
  Having a partner  0.12 ** — 
  Having dependent children 0.24 *** 0.21 ***
Internal mobility
  Living in the same municipality where born –0.13 *** — 
Municipality size
  100,000 inhabitants or more –0.08 * —
Problems when entering the program
  Social isolation –0.50 *** -0.43 ***
  Homelessness  –0.56 *** -0.47 **
  Unemployment 0.24 *** — 
  Prostitution –0.51 ** -0.36 **
  Drug dependency –0.12 * — 
  Mental health –0.53 *** -0.35 ***
  Physical health –0.39 *** -0.12 *
Effects of the program
Actions by the program 
  Labour market integration   0.33 ***
  Supervision   –0.21 **
Time spent in the program
  Less than one year   1.58 ***
  Per additional year (between 1 and 3)   — 
  Per additional year (4 or over)   –0.15 ***
Work experience during the program
  Worked while in the program   2.10 ***
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Secondly, the analysis includes infor-
mation on health and social problems and
confi rms previous research on personal ba rri-
ers to employment for people experiencing 
physical or mental health problems or having 
a history of social isolation, begging or pros-
titution. The analysis shows positive results 
for «labour market integration» measures 
and negative results for other measures not 
directly related to employment. This result 
was expected and confi rms the idea that re-
cipients with complex problems are «diffi cult» 
cases for the administration, while recipients 
with lesser health or social problems and 
more job experience are «easy» in a context 
of economic growth.
One way to examine the incidence of health 
and social problems, taking into account the 
relatively small number of cases, is to defi ne 
the standard case. The probability of labour 
market integration for the benefi ciaries fi tting
the standard case can then be calculated 
and the most frequent characteristics identi-
fi ed. In the Catalan program, the standard case 
corresponds to a woman, who entered the pro-
gram at the age of 37, spent more than one 
year in the program but did not gain any actual 
work experience during the program. She has 
primary education, is not an immigrant, lives 
with descendents in the household, has no 
acute problems diagnosed and is subject to 
supervision, social and labour market integra-
tion measures by the administration.
According to model 2 in table 1, the 
standard case has a 26.1% probability of 
success. As the characteristics of the case 
change, so does this probability. For exam-
ple, other things being equal, if it were a man 
instead of a woman, the probability increases 
by 2.8 points. If, on the contrary, that woman 
were 50 years old instead of 37, the probabi-
lity decreases by 10.3 points (see table 2). 
The most interesting result is, however, the 
48.2 point increase in the probability of inte-
gration if the woman in question had gained 
work experience during her stay in the pro-
gram, and the 37.1 point increase if she had 
stayed in the program less than one year. 
These fi ndings confi rm some of the basic 
theories on the relation between dependen-
cy and employment. Public administrations 
have a limited capacity to act with regard to 
complex social problems, but they can con-
sider the opportunity to offer real work expe-
rience through internships or other means to 
minimum income recipients not experien cing 
severe health or social problems. Another 
fi nding is that Sub-Saharan and Asian na-
tionalities have a substantially bigger impact 
than Latin American or Maghreb nationalities, 
probably because they are fewer in number 
and have more opportunities as a social 
group. 
THE ROLE OF THE ADMINISTRATION 
Besides personal characteristics and group 
profi les, individual case management should 
have an impact on the fate of minimum in-
come benefi ciaries. While this general point 
may be valid, it is diffi cult to examine the re-
lation between micromanagement of each 
case and performance across a large number 
Constant –0.66 *** –0.93 ***
N 18,818 18,813
Nagelkerke R2 0.10  0.33 
Percentage of success correctly predicted  65.9% 68.2%
Percentage of cases correctly predicted  60.2% 74.9%
(Cutting value = 33%)   
*** signifi cant at α = 0.001; ** signifi cant at α = 0.01; * signifi cant at α = 0.05. 
— Variables which were not included in the fi nal estimation of the model for not being signifi cant.
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of cases. Defi ning «quality» management for 
this specifi c program is complex and subject 
to intense debate among sector profession-
als. It is possible, however, to examine the 
extent to which basic administrative units 
achieve success levels —in terms of em-
ployment— which deviate from what would 
be expected according to the characteristics 
of the population they serve. The distribution 
of minimum income recipients is not homo-
TABLE 2. Variation in the probability of integration with respect to the standard case (Based on model 2)
  
Variation
 
Probability
 Variation in the
  
from
 
of success (in 
 probability of
Characteristics of benefi ciaries 
Standard 
standard
 
percentage
 success from
 
case
 
case
 
points)
 standard case (in
    percentage points)
Sex    
  Male No Yes 28.9 +2.8
Starting age     
  Per additional year of age from 16 to 49  37 38 25.9 –0.2
  Per additional year of age older than 49   50  15.8 –10.3
Education level    
  Incomplete primary or less No Yes 20.3 –5.8
  Secondary  No Yes 34.8 +8.7
  University  No Yes 31.6 +5.5
Nationality    
  Maghreb No Yes 30.6 +4.5
  Sub-Saharan No Yes 42.3 +16.2
  Latin American and Caribbean  No Yes 30.4 +4.3
  Asian No Yes 44.3 +18.2
Household characteristics    
  Dependent children  Yes No 22.3 –3.8
Problems when entering the program    
  Social isolation No Yes 18.7 –7.4
  Homelessness  No Yes 18.1 –8.0
  Prostitution No Yes 19.8 –6.3
  Mental health No Yes 19.9 –6.2
  Physical health No Yes 23.9 –2.2
Effects of the program
Actions by the program    
  Labour market integration Yes No 20.3 –5.8
  Supervision Yes No 30.4 +4.3
Time spent in the program    
  More than one year Yes <1  63.2 +37.1
  Per additional year (4 or over)  10 7.3 –18.8
Work experience during the program    
  Worked while in the program No Yes 74.3 +48.2
Probability of success of the standard case    26.1 
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geneous across the region. The personal 
characteristics of recipients differ across the 
various provinces, each of which is under 
the responsibility of a different administrative 
unit. 
A fi rst characteristic of local administra-
tive units is that some manage a small case-
load while a few manage larger ones. Is this 
heterogeneity in the size of the administrative 
units important? A priori, one might think that 
in an urban environment, with a large case-
load, it is unlikely to fi nd a high degree of 
personal rapport between professionals and 
benefi ciaries. In such a situation, it should 
be diffi cult to personalize integration strate-
gies for each individual case. Nevertheless, 
it is also possible that large administrative 
units have more experience and, therefore, a 
greater capacity to apply adequate measures 
to recipients. 
A second characteristic of the local ad-
ministrative unit is its public or private nature. 
Ninety percent of the local units are municipal 
social services while the rest are non-profi t 
organisations such as associations and so-
cial foundations. Are the results of non-profi t 
organisations better than those of the mu-
nicipal services? In order to test whether the 
characteristics of the unit in charge of the 
program have an impact on the success of 
the benefi ciaries, a regression model was 
estimated in which the percentage of labour 
market integration for each unit depends 
on its caseload and on its nature (public or 
private). For this purpose, the expected pro-
bability of success on the basis of model 2 in 
table 1 was introduced as a control variable. 
Since the probabilities of being successful 
are lower in areas where there is a concen-
tration of population with specifi c social or 
health problems, by introducing the expected 
probability of success it was possible to con-
trol for the level of diffi culty of each area. 
Obviously, there are unit characteristics 
other than size that can have an impact on 
the percentage of success they achieve. 
Management quality is related to the number 
of professionals working in the units, their 
experience and organisation. Unfortunately, 
there was no information available on the way 
offi ces work. Nevertheless, whether there is a 
«caseload effect» or a «public/private nature 
effect» could be of interest to policy makers 
and central managers responsible for imple-
menting minimum income policy programs.
The analysis in this section is based on 
the 456 administrative units managing the 
program. The dependent variable is the per-
centage of cases that left the program as a 
result of labour market integration. The inde-
pendent variables are the number of cases 
managed by each local unit and a dummy 
variable that equals one if the unit belongs 
to a municipal administration. In addition, the 
mean of the predicted probability of success 
for all benefi ciaries was calculated for each 
unit, using model 2 of table 1 as a control 
variable. Caseloads range from 1 to 280. The 
results of the estimation of the OLS regres-
sion model using all units are shown in the 
fi rst column of table 3. 
The model is signifi cant and explains 
34% of the total variance in administrative 
unit success. The fi rst fi nding is that the 
caseload negatively affects the administra-
tive units’ performance, although the effect 
is rather slight4. The second fi nding is that the 
non-profi t organisations’ units have higher 
percentages of success (an average of eight 
per cent more) than the units belonging to 
a public administration. The model performs 
quite well according to the model diagno-
sis, but there were a number of cases which 
could introduce bias in the estimated coef-
fi cients, since they were administrative units 
dealing with one case5. Since it was sensible 
4 One hundred more cases reduces the expected per-
centage of success by 4 points.
5 In size one administrative units, the success percen-
tages vary radically from 0 to 100 with only one change 
in the labour market integration of one individual. 
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to exclude those cases from the analysis, 
the second column of Table 3 presents the 
estimation of the same model excluding the
administrative units with only one case. 
The quality of the model improves and the 
coeffi cient, signifi cance and sign of the vari-
ables (size and nature) are maintained, show-
ing the robustness of the results.
SUCCESSFUL AND UNSUCCESSFUL 
PROFILES 
Personal characteristics and initial characte-
ristics have an impact on the two factors that 
are most closely related to success: duration 
in the program and gaining work experien-
ce while in the program. For this reason, this 
section addresses whether some characte-
ristics tend to occur simultaneously in order 
to see whether it is possible to identify basic 
groups of recipients. Through cluster analysis 
it is possible to classify individual cases into 
a number of groups according to their most 
characteristic trait. The resulting profi les are 
useful to have a more precise idea of the 
degree of heterogeneity in the caseload, 
the different level of each group’s association 
with success and the diffi culty of managing 
various groups for the social services.
The analysis shows that there are two 
majority groups that account for more than 
60% of the cases: women with low levels of 
studies and single women with employability 
problems. Another two groups account for 
15.4% of the cases (recipients whose main 
trait is poor physical health) and 10% of the 
cases (recipients originally from North Afri-
can countries). Six smaller groups represent, 
altogether, over 10% of the cases. Among 
these groups there are immigrants (from La-
tin America, Sub-Saharan countries and Asia) 
and Spanish nationals (older people living 
alone in larger towns identifi ed as «chronics»; 
young adults with a low level of studies iden-
tifi ed as «casuals»; and university graduates 
with employment problems). Table 4 presents 
the ten profi les ranked according to the per-
centage of success in labour market integra-
tion insertion. 
Looking at the relation between pro-
fi les and labour market integration, some 
groups clearly achieve better results than 
others. Three of the smaller groups are the 
least «diffi cult» for the administration, since 
they exit the program quickly after fi nding 
jobs in a favourable economic environment. 
They are young claimants with low levels of 
education, those from Asia and those from 
Sub-Saharan Africa. On the other hand, the 
two main groups of women, the «chronics» 
and the «poor physical health» group, had 
placement levels of between 38 and 24 
per cent in a context of economic expan-
TABLE 3.  Effect of size and public/private nature of local units on their performance. Dependent variable: 
percentage of labour market integration (OLS regression coeffi cients)
 All administrative units  Administrative units
 (1 to 280 cases) with more than 1 case
Number of benefi ciaries attended (size of the unit) –0.03 * –0.03 **
The local unit belongs to a public administration –7.81 ** –6.64 ***
Predicted percentage of labour market integrationinsertion 
(calculated from model 2 in table 1) 1.20 *** 1.31 ***
Constant 4.06  –0.61 *
N 456  441 
Adjusted R2  0.36  0.43 
*** signifi cant at α = 0.001; ** signifi cant at α = 0.01; * signifi cant at α = 0.05. 
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sion. The results may give some insights 
to policy makers and managers of similar 
programs, since they confi rm that a major-
ity of benefi ciaries have personal charac-
teristics which make them less likely to be 
immediately successful in labour market 
integration terms. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Minimum income programs have a majority 
of benefi ciaries who can be considered com-
plex cases for various reasons. In the Catalan 
case, most of the households receiving this 
type of «last resort» social assistance pro-
tection could not be activated by the adminis-
tration at a time of economic expansion. This 
is because either benefi ciaries were facing 
personal barriers or the actual implemen-
tation of the activation policy was not suffi -
ciently effective. 
This poses the question of whether the 
policy discourse is adequate for a signifi cant 
portion of the caseload given the adminis-
tration’s resources and ability. As mentioned 
earlier, the Catalan program separates mini-
mum income recipients into two groups: 
those who are more «ready to work» and 
those who need to solve personal problems 
before the administration considers they can 
enter the job market. This double itinerary 
makes the Catalan case interesting, since it 
is the expression of a fl exible response to in-
dividual characteristics. 
According to the analysis, the fi rst group 
is vulnerable to job instability given that the 
quality of the jobs they can fi nd is low, but 
nevertheless, they can be activated in a con-
text of economic expansion. The analysis has 
shown that the critical factors for public ad-
ministrations managing unemployed people 
receiving minimum income support are: 
a) the time spent in the program, and, b) the 
po ssibility of gaining real work experience 
during their stay in the program. The time 
limit for being able to exit the program suc-
cessfully is around 3 years. 
The second group is much more numer-
ous, heterogeneous and diffi cult to manage. 
In the Catalan case, the benefi ciaries who 
fi nd it more diffi cult to leave the program 
add up to 77% of the cases. Our analysis 
confi rms prior research on personal barriers 
to employment and indentifi es the following 
characteristics as being important barriers: 
homelessness, social isolation, prostitu-
tion, having mental health limitations or poor 
physical health. Migrants cannot be consi-
dered «diffi cult» cases in the Catalan region 
according to our analysis; nevertheless, there 
are differences among immigrant recipients, 
North Africans and Latin Americans being 
least likely to successfully exit the program 
and fi nd jobs. 
TABLE 4. Profi les of benefi ciaries according to success in labour market integration
Profi le Main characteristic  % Success % Cases 
  1 «Casuals» (young adults with a low level of studies)  62.7 2.0
  2 Asian 56.8 0.5
  3 Sub-Saharan 55.1 1.4
  4 Latin American  45.4 3.7
  5 University graduates with labour problems 44.8 1.5
  6 Maghrebian 40.3 10.1
  7 Women alone with labour problems 38.7 29.3
  8 Women with no studies  25.9 32.4
  9 «Chronics» (older people living alone)  25.0 3.7
 10 Poor physical health 24.5 15.4
106_10 aju 03 Riba.indd   Sec1:56 13/01/11   8:41
Reis 133, enero-marzo 2011, pp. 43-58
Clara Riba, Xavier Ballart and Jaume Blasco 57
Dividing the benefi ciaries into ten cluster 
groups made it possible to take into account 
the variance between caseloads and to ad-
just the measure of success to the charac-
 te ristics of each group. The analysis confi rms that 
some profiles have complex problems 
that require intensity in the treatment and a 
long-term approach. Public administrations 
having been familiarized with the «personal 
development itinerary» idea, it may now be 
necessary to introduce incentives for admi-
nistrative units to better adjust their interven-
tion to the varying characteristics of indi-
vi dual cases. 
According to the analysis, the size of the 
caseload has an effect —albeit slight— on 
the performance of administrative units. In 
practical terms, however, reducing the case-
load of administrative units so that they can 
devote more time to each individual case 
may not be the solution. It seems that the 
«private» or «third sector» nature of the lo-
cal units has a bigger effect than their size. 
Working with non-profi t associations and so-
cial foundations could be a way to improve 
performance. Therefore, it is worth increasing 
the number of this kind of administrative unit, 
which was very small when this analysis was 
carried out.  
It would not be correct to conclude that 
activation policies are inappropriate for a 
majority of cases which can be considered 
complex in terms of social inclusion. The 
study shows that Catalan schemes were not 
appropriate for facilitating the labour mar-
ket integration of a signifi cant proportion of 
benefi ciaries at a time of economic expan-
sion. However, administrative units could 
have been more effective if they had been 
capable of working more intensively with lo-
cal governments and non-profi t associations
to offer a wider variety of responses, inclu ding 
voluntary or real work experience prior to la-
bour market integration in order to achieve a 
better fi t to the profi le of the various groups 
of benefi ciares.
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